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Abstract
We introduce a new value for NTU games with coalition structure. This
value coincides with the consistent value for trivial coalition structures, and
with the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure. Furthermore,
we present two characterizations: the ﬁrst one using a consistency property
and the second one using balanced contributions properties.
1. Introduction
One of the most important issues of cooperative game theory is to deﬁne “good”
values, studying which interesting properties are satisﬁed by these values and
obtaining axiomatic characterizations using some of these properties.
In cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games), Shapley (1953)
introduced the Shapley value. He deﬁnes this value as the average of marginal
contributions of players when all orders are equally likely. Moreover, he character-
izes it as the only value satisfying eﬃciency, null player, symmetry, and additivity.
Later, several authors obtain new characterizations of the Shapley value using
other properties. For instance, Myerson (1980) using balanced contributions and
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) consistency.
There are several extensions of TU games. The most natural is to games
without transferable utility (NTU games). Other extension is to TU games with
∗Finacial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia (through grant PB98-0613-
C02-01) and Xunta de Galicia (through grant PGIDT00PXI30001PN) is gratefully aknowledged.a coalition structure. This model was introduced by Owen (1977) for studying
situations where players are partitioned into several groups. Of course, a third
extension is to NTU games with coalition structure. Since the Shapley value has
a lot of interesting properties in TU g a m e s ,m a n ya u t h o r sd e c i d e dt op r o p o s e ,i n
these extended models, values which are generalizations of the Shapley value.
In NTU games the Harsanyi value (Harsanyi (1963)), and the Shapley NTU
value (Aumann (1985)), are generalizations of the Shapley value. Later, Maschler
and Owen (1989, 1992) deﬁne the consistent value for hyperplane games and
NTU games respectively. The main idea behind this generalization is to maintain
(as far as possible) the consistency property from the Shapley value. Maschler
and Owen (1989) prove that, for hyperplane games, the consistent value can be
obtained in a similar way that the Shapley value, i.e., as the average of marginal
contributions of players when all orders are equally likely. Later, Hart and Mas-
Colell (1996) develop a bargaining mechanism which implements the consistent
value and characterize it by means of balanced contributions.
Owen (1977) introduces a generalization of the Shapley value, called the Owen
value, for TU games with coalition structure. He deﬁnes it as the average of
marginal contributions of players assuming that: all orders in which players of the
same element of the partition are together are equally likely; the rest of orders have
probability 0. Moreover, he characterizes his value using similar axioms to those
used by Shapley (1953). Later, Winter (1992) characterizes the Owen value using
the consistency property and Calvo, Lasaga, and Winter (1996) using properties
of balanced contributions.
NTU games with coalition structure are studied by Winter (1991), where he
characterizes the Game Coalition Structure Value. This value is a generalization
of the Harsanyi value for NTU games and the Owen value for TU games with
coalition structure.
It was of our interest to know whether the consistent value and the Owen value
could be generalized the same way to games with coalition structure. We know
that the Shapley value, the consistent value, and the Owen value are obtained as
an average of marginal contributions depending on equal-likely orders. Thus, it
s e e m sr e a s o n a b l et og e n e r a l i z et h e s ev a l u e si nt h es a m ew a y .W ec a l lr a n d o mo r d e r
coalitional value (Maschler and Owen (1992) also suggest the name random order
value for the consistent value) to the value obtained in this way. Remarkably, this
value misses most of the nice properties of the previous values (Shapley, Owen, and
consistent); namely, it is not consistent, nor satisﬁes the balanced contributions
properties.
2Then, we introduce a new value, called the consistent coalitional value. This
new value can be characterized in two ways: the ﬁrst one using the consistency
property and the second one using the balanced contributions properties. We must
note that our characterizations generalize the results about consistency obtained
by Maschler and Owen (1989) for the consistent value and Winter (1992) for the
Owen value, and the results about balanced contributions obtained by Hart and
Mas-Colell (1996) for the consistent value and Calvo et al. (1996) for the Owen
value. We believe these characterizations make the consistent coalitional value a
proper generalization of the consistent and the Owen value for NTU games with
coalition structure.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notation and
some previous results. In Section 3 we deﬁne the consistent coalitional value and
the random order coalitional value. In Section 4 we give a list of properties and
study which are satisﬁed by both values. In Section 5 we present two axiomatic
characterizations of the consistent coalitional value. Finally, in the Appendix, we
present the proofs of the results obtained in the paper.
2. Deﬁnitions and Previous Results
Given a set A, |A| denotes the cardinal of A. If x,y ∈ RN we say y ≤ x when
yi ≤ xi for each i ∈ N and x ∗ y is the scalar product
P
i∈N
xiyi. We denote RN
+ =
©





x ∈ RN : xi > 0,∀i
ª




|xi| =1(in this case |xi| =m a x {xi,−xi}). Let λ ∈ RN be a
vector orthogonal to some surface on RN,w es a yt h a tλ is orthonormal if it is
normalized.
A game without transferable utility,o rs i m p l ya nNTU game,i sap a i r(N,V)
where N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of players and V is a correspondence (character-
istic function) which assigns to each coalition S ⊂ N as u b s e tV (S) ⊂ RS which
represents all the possible payoﬀst h a tm e m b e r so fS can obtain for themselves
when play cooperatively. For S ⊂ N, when there is no ambiguity, we maintain
the notation V when refer to the application V restricted to S as player set. We
also denote S = N\S.
We impose the next conditions on the function V :
(A1) For each S ⊂ N,t h es e tV (S) is comprehensive (i.e.,i fx ∈ V (S) and
y ∈ RS with y ≤ x,t h e ny ∈ V (S)) and bounded above (i.e.,f o re a c hx ∈ RS,
the set {y ∈ V (S):y ≥ x} is compact).
3(A2) For each S ⊂ N, the boundary of V (S), which we denote by ∂V (S),i s
smooth (on each point of the boundary there exists an unique outward orthonor-
mal vector) and nonlevel (the outward vector on each point of ∂V (S) has its










i are continuous functions on ∂V (S).




(A5) For each S ⊂ N, the origin 0S =( 0 ,...,0) ∈ RS belongs to V (S).
Property (A5) is a normalization and does not aﬀect our results.
We denote by NTU(N) the set of NTU games over N and by NTU the set
of all NTU games.
We now introduce two particular subclasses of NTU games studied in this
paper.
We say that (N,V) is a game with transferable utility (or TU game) if it exists
a function v :2 N → R, called the characteristic function, satisfying that v(∅)=
0 and for each S ⊂ N, V(S)=
½





. Usually we represent a
TU game as the pair (N,v). We denote by TU(N) the set of TU games over N
and by TU the set of all TU games.








S ∗ x ≤ v(S)
ª
(2.1)
for some v :2 N → R.
Notice that each TU game is a hyperplane game (just take λ
S
i =1for each
S ⊂ N and i ∈ S).
A coalition structure C over N is a partition of the player set, i.e., C =
{C1,C 2,...,Cm} ⊂ 2N where
S
Cq∈C
Cq = N and Cq∩Cr = ∅ when q 6= r.W ed e n o t e
by (N,V,C)an NTU game (N,V)with coalition structure C over N.W ed e n o t e
CNTU(N) as the set of NTU games with coalition structure over N (CTU(N)
for TU games) and by CNTU the set of all NTU games with a coalition structure
(CTU for TU games).
Given S ⊂ N we denote by CS the structure C restricted to the players in S,
i.e., CS = {Cq ∩ S}Cq∈C. Notice that this implies that CS may have less or the
same number of coalitions as C. By simplicity we use C−i instead of CN\{i}.
4A payoﬀ conﬁguration for (N,V) is a set of payoﬀs x =
¡
xS¢
S⊂N with xS ∈
V (S) for all S ⊂ N.
Given Ga subset of CNTU (or NTU),avalue Γ on G is a correspondence
which assigns to each (N,V,C) ∈ G as u b s e tΓ(N,V,C) ⊂ V (N).W es a yt h a t ¡
ΓS¢
S⊂N is a payoﬀ conﬁguration associated to Γ if ΓS ∈ Γ(S,V,CS) for all
S ⊂ N. When several NTU games or coalition structures are involved we write
ΓS (V ), ΓS (C), or ΓS (V,C) instead of ΓS.
If Γ(N,V,C) is a single point of V (N) for all (N,V,C) ∈ G we say that Γ
is a single value. Of course each single value has an unique payoﬀ conﬁguration
associated. Usually we write ΓN instead of Γ(N,V,C).
We denote by φ
N (or φ
N (v)) the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) of the TU
game (N,v).
For TU games with coalition structure φ
N,o rφ
N (v,C), denotes the Owen
value (Owen (1977)), which is a generalization of the Shapley value (when C =
{N} or C = {{1},...,{n}}, the Owen value coincides with the Shapley value).
Let us mention two characterizations of the Owen value. Winter (1992) shows
that the Owen value is the only value satisfying eﬃciency, individual symme-
try, covariance, consistency, and GBCP (Game Between Coalitions Property).
Later, Calvo et al. (1996) show that the Owen value is the only value satisfying
eﬃciency, balanced contributions among coalitions, and balanced contributions
among players in the same coalition1.
We say that a single value ϕ satisﬁes balanced contributions among coalitions





















We say that a single value ϕ satisﬁes balanced contributions among players in










We now present the consistent value for NTU games following Maschler and
Owen (1989,1992).
1Even though Calvo et al (1996) present these two balanced properties as only one, we think
that for our paper is more intuitive the formulation as two properties.
5Let Π be the set of all orders over N.G i v e n π ∈ Π we deﬁne the set of
predecessors of i under π as
P(π,i)={j ∈ N : π(j) < π(i)}.








∈ V (P(π,i) ∪ {i})
o
.
So, di(π)is the maximum that player i c a no b t a i ni nV (S) after his predecessors
obtain their respective dj(π)’s. We denote d(π)=( di (π))i∈N.
It is straightforward to prove that if (N,V) is a hyperplane game,
di(π)=










Given a hyperplane game (N,V),t h econsistent value ΨN (or ΨN(V )),M a s c h l e r
and Owen (1989), is the vector of expected marginal contributions, where each







Notice that each d(π) is an eﬃcient vector (it belongs to the boundary of
V (N)). Since we are dealing with hyperplane games, this boundary is ﬂat and
the consistent value is also an eﬃcient value.






















One way to extend a hyperplane solution to the general class of NTU games
with convex V (S)’s is to pass arbitrary hyperplanes to the various sets V (S).
These hyperplanes determine a hyperplane game for which we know the solution.
If this solution belongs to V (N) we say that this is a solution of the NTU game
(N,V). This is the way adopted by Maschler and Owen (1992) for extending the
consistent value to the class of NTU games.
6Formally, given an NTU game (N,V) we say that (N,V 0) is a supporting






S ∗ x ≤ v(S)
ª
where λ
S is orthonormal to the boundary of V (S) and v(S)=m a x
©
λ
S ∗ x : x ∈ V (S)
ª
.
Notice that V (S) ⊂ V 0(S).
Given an NTU game (N,V) ap a y o ﬀ conﬁguration x is a consistent value
for (N,V) if there exists a supporting hyperplane game for (N,V) such that
xS = ΨS (V 0) for all S ⊂ N.
It is remarkable that Maschler and Owen (1992) even suggest the name random
order value instead of consistent value.
3. The Consistent Coalitional Value
In this section we deﬁne two NTU values for NTU games with coalition structure,
which generalize the consistent NTU value and the Owen value. The random
order coalitional value generalizes the deﬁnition of Ψ as the average of marginal
contributions. The consistent coalitional value generalizes the expression (2.2) of
Ψ.
We ﬁrst introduce the random order coalitional value for hyperplane games.
Let (N,V,C) be an NTU game with coalition structure. We say that an order
π ∈ Π is admissible with respect to C if given i,j ∈ Cq ∈ C and k ∈ N such that
π(i) < π(k) < π(j) then k ∈ Cq. We denote by ΠC the set of all orders over N
admissible with respect to C.
Given a hyperplane game (N,V,C),t h erandom order coalitional value ΦN
(or ΦN(V,C)) is deﬁned as the expected marginal contributions when all the








It is trivial to see that if (N,V) is a TU game then Φ coincides with the Owen
value. Moreover if C = {N} or C = {{1},...,{n}} then Φ coincides with the
consistent value.




S⊂N associated to Φ, which satisﬁes that ΦS = ΦS (V,CS) ∈ ∂V (S) for
all S ⊂ N.
7We now deﬁne the consistent coalitional value for hyperplane games.
Given a hyperplane game (N,V,C),t h econsistent coalitional value ΥN (or
ΥN (V,C)) is the only point satisfying the following two conditions:











































































S⊂N , which satisﬁes that ΥS = ΥS (V,CS) ∈ ∂V (S) for all
S ⊂ N.
We must admit that the deﬁnition of the consistent coalitional value is not so
intuitive as the deﬁnition of Φ, which is the natural extension to hyperplane games
of the expression of the Owen value in terms of expected marginal contributions.
Nevertheless, we believe that Υ is a more suitable value for hyperplane games (and
NTU games) than Υ. The reason is that, as we will prove later, Υ satisﬁes more
interesting properties. Moreover, Υ can be characterized generalizing axiomatic
characterizations of the Owen value and the consistent value.
The generalization of Υ to NTU games is done analogously to the consistent
value. For an NTU game with coalition structure (N,V,C),w et a k ef o re a c h
coalition S ⊂ N a orthonormal vector λ
S to the boundary of V (S).L e t(N,V 0,C)
be the resulting hyperplane game and Υ =
¡
ΥS¢
S⊂N the consistent coalitional
payoﬀ conﬁguration associated to (N,V 0,C).I fΥ is feasible in (N,V,C) then we
say that Υ is a consistent coalitional payoﬀ conﬁguration.
We can extend the random order coalitional Φ to NTU games in a similar
way.




then ΥN = ΨN.
Then, the consistent coalitional value is a generalization of the consistent value for
NTU with coalition structure. Moreover, for TU games with coalition structure
the consistent coalitional value coincides with the Owen value (we will see it later
in Corollary 1).
The random order coalitional value also generalizes the consistent NTU value
and the Owen value.
We now compute Φ and Υ in the following example:
Example 1. (Owen (1972)). Let (N,V,C) be the hyperplane game such that
N = {1,2,3} and
V ({i})={xi ∈ R
{i} : xi ≤ 0}, ∀i ∈ N,
V ({1,2})={(x1,x 2) ∈ R




V ({1,3})={(x1,x 3) ∈ R
{1,3} : x1 ≤ 0,x 3 ≤ 0},
V ({2,3})={(x2,x 3) ∈ R
{2,3} : x2 ≤ 0,x 3 ≤ 0},
and




xi ≤ 1;xi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N;xi + xj ≤ 1 ∀i,j ∈ N}.

































In the following lemma we prove that the random order coalitional value also
satisﬁes (3.1).





































9Proof. See the Appendix.
Since Φ and Υ are diﬀe r e n t( E x a m p l e1 )w ec o n c l u d et h a tΦ does not satisfy
(3.2).
In next theorem we prove the existence of consistent coalitional payoﬀ conﬁg-
urations.
Theorem 1:E v e r yNTU game has a consistent coalitional payoﬀ conﬁgura-
tion.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 1 we can con-
clude that every NTU game has a random order coalitional payoﬀ conﬁguration.
4. Properties
In this section we present several desirable properties and study which of them
are satisﬁed by the consistent coalitional value and the random order coalitional
value.
We now deﬁne some properties of NTU values. Some of them are well known
in the literature of NTU games. Others are introduced in this paper generaliz-
ing properties of TU games. We present the deﬁnitions for single values. The
deﬁnition for payoﬀ conﬁgurations associated to general values is straightforward.
We say that a value Γ satisﬁes eﬃciency (EF) if for each (N,V,C) ∈ CNTU,
ΓN ∈ ∂V (N).
Remark 2.S i n c eV satisﬁes A2 we have that if Γ satisﬁes eﬃciency then for
each (N,V,C) ∈ CNTU and S ⊂ N, there exists λ
S ∈ RS
++ satisfying λ
S ∗ ΓS =
v(S) where v(S)=m a x
©
λ
S ∗ x : x ∈ V (S)
ª
. Of course the reciprocal is also true.
Given an CNTU game (N,V,C) we say that two players i,j ∈ N are symmet-
rics if : For each S ⊂ N\{i,j} if x ∈ V (S ∪ {i}), yj = xi, and yk = xk for each
k ∈ S then, y ∈ V (S ∪ {j}).F o re a c hS ⊃ {i,j} if x ∈ V (S),y i = xj, yj = xi,
and xk = yk for each k ∈ S\{i,j} then, y ∈ V (S).
We say that a value Γ satisﬁes individual symmetry (IS) i ff o re a c hp a i ro f






10We now generalize the property of covariance to hyperplane games following
Maschler and Owen (1989). Let (N,V,C) and (N, e V,C) be two hyperplane games





S ∗ x ≤ v(S)
ª
and e V (S)=
n
x ∈ R
S : e λ
S
∗ x ≤ e v(S)
o
.
We say that (N,V,C) and (N, e V,C)are equivalent under a linear transforma-
tion of player i’s utility if there exist two constants a ∈ R++ and b ∈ R such that
















if i ∈ S, and





a linear transformation of player i’s utility then, e x ∈ V (S)if and only if there
exists x ∈ V (S) satisfying: e xi = axi + b and e xj = xj if j ∈ S \{ i}.
We say that a value Γ satisﬁes covariance ( COV) if, given two hyperplane











= Γj(N,V,C) if j ∈ N\{i}.
Thus, covariance just states that, if we linearly change player i’s utility func-
tion, his ﬁnal payoﬀ change the same way, while other players’ payoﬀsr e m a i n
constant.
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) characterize the Shapley value as the only value
on TU games satisfying consistency and other properties. Later, Winter (1992)
extends the deﬁnition of consistency to TU games with coalition structure.
Maschler and Owen (1989) show that if we deﬁne the property of consistency,
of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) in NTU games as in the TU case, there is no
value satisfying consistency and other “basic” properties (for instance, eﬃciency).
Then they provide a weaker deﬁnition of consistency for hyperplane games called
bilateral consistency.
We now present a generalization of the property of bilateral consistency to
hyperplane games with coalition structure. Our bilateral consistency generalizes
the bilateral consistency of Maschler and Owen (1989) in the same way that the
consistency of Winter (1992) generalizes the consistency of Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989).
11Given a value Γ, a hyperplane game (N,V,C), and S ⊂ Cq ∈ C,t h ereduced



















It is straightforward to prove that VS is the hyperplane game given, for each





























We say that a value Γ satisﬁes l-consistency if for each hyperplane game













By simplicity we will take ΓS
i (VS)=ΓS
i (VS,{S}) and ΓN
i (V )=ΓN
i (V,C).
We call bilateral consistency (BCONS) to 2-consistency.
Myerson (1980) characterizes the Shapley value using eﬃciency and balanced
contributions (BC). Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) introduce the following general-
ization of BC for NTU games.
We say that a value Γ satisﬁes average balanced contributions (ABC) if for





























Later, Calvo et al. (1996) generalize the property of balanced contributions
for TU games with a coalition structure obtaining two properties: BCAC and
BCAP.
We now introduce the properties of average balanced contributions among
coalitions and average balanced contributions among players in the same coali-
tion for NTU games with coalition structure. Our average balanced properties
generalize the balanced properties of Calvo et al. (1996) in the same way that the
average balanced property of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) generalizes the balanced
property of Myerson (1980).
12We say that a value Γ satisﬁes average balanced contributions among coalitions
(ABCAC)if for each NTU game (N,V,C),S⊂ N, and C0
















































We say that a value Γ satisﬁes average balanced contributions among players
in the same coalition (ABCAP) if for each NTU game (N,V,C),S⊂ N, C0
q =
Cq ∩ S ∈ CS, and i ∈ C0































Before studying the properties satisﬁed by the consistent coalitional value we
need a previous result.






Proof. This result is due to Maschler and Owen (1989). ¥
Notice that Lemma 2 says that if we pass to the reduced game VS and then
remove a player (i) w eo b t a i nt h es a m eg a m ea si fw er e m o v et h ep l a y e rﬁrst
(N\{i}) and then pass to the reduced game VS\{i}.
Proposition 1. The consistent coalitional value satisﬁes l-consistency for
each l with 1 ≤ l ≤ n.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In next theorem we study which of these properties are satisﬁed by the con-
sistent coalitional value.
Theorem 2. The consistent coalitional value satisﬁes EF, IS, COV, BCONS,
ABCAC,a n dABCAP.
Proof. See the Appendix.
13Remark 3. The random order coalitional value satisﬁes EF, IS, COV,a n d
ABCAC.
It is trivial to see that Φ satisﬁes EF and IS.
Maschler and Owen (1989) show that, for any permutation π,t h ev e c t o rd(π)
satisﬁes COV.S i n c eΦ i st h em e a no fs o m eo ft h e s ed(π)’s, we conclude that Φ
also satisﬁes COV.
By Lemma 1, Φ satisﬁes (3.1). Now using arguments similar to those used in
the proof of Theorem 2 for Υ we can conclude that Φ also satisﬁes ABCAC.
Later, we will obtain, as a consequence of theorems 3 and 4, that Φ does not
satisfy neither BCONS nor ABCAP.
By Theorem 2 we know that Υ satisﬁes, in NTU games or hyperplane games,
all the interesting properties that the Owen value satisﬁes in TU games. Although,
by Remark 3, Φ does not.
5. Axiomatic characterizations
In this section we present two axiomatic characterizations of the consistent coali-
tional value. The ﬁrst one on the set of hyperplane games using consistency. The
second one on the set of NTU games using balanced contributions.
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) characterize the Shapley value on the class of TU
games as the only single value satisfying EF, SYM (i fi and j are symmetric
players then must receive the same), COV,and CONS.Later, Maschler and Owen
(1989) and Winter (1992) extend this result in two diﬀerent ways.
Maschler and Owen (1989) extend this result to the class of hyperplane games.
They prove that the consistent value is the only single value satisfying EF, SYM,
COV, and CONS.
Winter (1992) extends it to the class of TU games with coalition structure.
He proves that the Owen value is the only single value satisfying EF, IS, COV,
CONS, and GBCP (Game Between Coalitions Property).
We say that a single value ϕ satisﬁes GBCP if for each TU game (N,v,C) and













for each S ⊂ M. This prop-
14erty says that the amount received by a coalition in the game played by the coali-
tions (all coalitions act as a single player) coincides with the sum of the amounts
received by the members of this coalition in the original game.
This property can not be exported to hyperplane games.
It is easy to check that the proof of Winter’s result about the characterization
of the Owen value is also valid if we replace GBCP by BCAC. Then, the Owen
value is the only single value satisfying EF, IS, COV, CONS, and BCAC.
In Theorem 3 below we generalize the results of Hart an Mas-Colell (1989),
Maschler and Owen (1989), and Winter (1992) to hyperplane games with coalition
structure.
Theorem 3: The consistent coalitional value is the only single value on the
class of hyperplane games satisfying EF, IS, COV,BCONS, and ABCAC.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark 4. The properties used in this theorem are independent (see the
Appendix).
Myerson (1980) characterizes the Shapley value on the class of TU games as
the only single value satisfying EF and BC. Later, Calvo et al. (1996) and Hart
and Mas-Colell (1996) extends this result in two diﬀerent ways.
Calvo et al. (1996) extend it to the class of TU games with coalition structure.
They prove that the Owen value is the only single value satisfying EF, BCAP,
and BCAC. Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) extends Myerson’s result to the class of
NTU games proving that the consistent value is the only value satisfying EF and
ABC.
In Theorem 4 below we generalize the results of Myerson (1980), Calvo et al.
(1996), and Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) to NTU games with coalition structure.
Theorem 4. The consistent coalitional value is the only value on the class of
NTU games with coalition structure satisfying EF, ABCAC,a n dABCAP.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark 5. The properties used in this theorem are independent (see the
Appendix).
We now prove that the consistent coalitional value generalizes the Owen value.
Corollary 1:F o re a c hTU game (N,v,C) the Owen value is the only consis-
tent coalitional value.
15Proof. See the Appendix.
The results obtained in this section about the consistent coalitional value and
t h er e l a t i o nw i t ho t h e rv a l u e sc a nb es u m m a r i z e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gt a b l e .
About consistency
Without coalition structure With coalition structure
TU Hyperplane TU Hyperplane
Shapley Consistent Owen Consistent
Coalitional
EF EF EF EF
SYM SYM IS IS
COV COV COV COV
CONS BCONS CONS BCONS
BCAC ABCAC
About balanced contributions
Without coalition structure With coalition structure
TU NTU TU NTU
Shapley Consistent Owen Consistent
Coalitional
EF EF EF EF
BC ABC BCAC ABCAC
BCAP ABCAP
Then, the consistent coalitional value is the right generalization of the Owen
v a l u ea n dt h ec o n s i s t e n tv a l u et oNTU games with coalition structure if we focus
in the properties of consistency and balanced contributions of both values.
6. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:L e tΦ =
¡
ΦS¢
S⊂N be the random order coalitional payoﬀ
conﬁguration for (N,V,C).B y d e ﬁnition, ΦN
j is the expected marginal contri-
bution of player j over all the |ΠC| admissible orders of players with respect to
C. We classify these orders in |C| groups according the last coalition Cr in such
orders.
Let ΠC(Cr) be the set of admissible orders with respect to C in which players
of coalition Cr are in the last position. Notice that |ΠC| = |C||ΠC(Cr)|for each
16Cr ∈ C.
If Cr 6= Cq, then the expected marginal contribution for each player j ∈ Cq in
the orders of ΠC(Cr) coincides with the expected marginal contribution of player




























































































































































































































































which is precisely the statement of this lemma. ¥
Proof of Theorem 1. The structure of the proof is analogous to the proof
of Theorem 3.3 in Maschler and Owen (1992), where they prove the existence of
the consistent value for general NTU games.




TÃN with xT ∈ RT such that, for any S Ã N, the collection
¡
xT¢
T⊂S is a consistent coalitional payoﬀ conﬁguration of the game
(S,V,CS), there exists xN ∈ ∂V (N) such that
¡
xT¢
T⊂N is a consistent
coalitional payoﬀ conﬁguration of (N,V,C).
For n =1the claim is trivially true, being the collection the empty set ∅.




TÃN such that, for any S Ã N,
¡
xT¢
T⊂S is a consistent coalitional
payoﬀ conﬁguration of the game (S,V,CS).







i∈T be the orthonor-












S⊂N be the (unique) consistent coalitional payoﬀ conﬁguration for






S ∗ y ≤ v(S)
ª
.
18By deﬁnition of V z, ΥS (z)=xS for all S Ã N, independently of the chosen
z.
We want to show that there exists a point xN ∈ ∂V (N)such that the collection ¡
xT¢
T⊂N is a consistent coalitional payoﬀ conﬁguration for (N,V,C). Notice that
it is enough to prove that ΥN ¡
xN¢
= xN.W em a k eu s eo faﬁxed point theorem.
Since Υ satisﬁes (3.1) and (3.2) and the λ
S
i ’s are strictly positive and continuous
functions, ΥN(z) is also a continuous function of z.




δ : i ∈ T Ã N
¾
,w h e r eδ is given by (A4).
































By (A5), v(N) ≥ 0, and since the λ
N

































≥− (|C| − 1)Mδ − Mδ = −|C|Mδ








j (z) ≥− Mδ for each Cq ∈ C.






















































i > δ, λ
N is normalized, and δ < 1,






> −(|Cq| − 1)Mδ − M − M
> −(|Cq| − 1)M − 2M
≥− 2|Cq|M.
So, ΥN
i (z) > −2M.
The rest of the proof is analogous to Maschler and Owen’s (1992) and we just





We deﬁne D =
©
x ∈ RN : xi ≥− 2M for all i ∈ N
ª
.G i v e n a v e c t o r z on
∂V (N) ∩ D (which is the thick line in ﬁgure 1) we have proved that ΥN (z) ∈
D;a n ds ot h ep o i n tF (z) obtained by applying a projection centered at σ =
(−2M,...,−2M) ∈ RN,a l s ob e l o n g st o∂V (N) ∩ D (see ﬁgure 1). By applying a
standard ﬁxed point theorem over the (continuous) function F,w eﬁnd the desired
xN. ¥
20P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . We proceed by induction on l.T h e t h e o r e m i s
trivially true for l =1 .A s s u m ei ti st r u ef o ra tm o s tl − 1.
If we apply the induction hypothesis to the game (N\{j},V,C −j) with j ∈










i (V ). (6.3)














i (V ). (6.4)
To do so, we analyze the left side of this expression. Assume that i ∈ S ⊂ Cq













































































































































































We now analyze the four terms separately:









































j (V ), second































































possible sets S such that
























































































































































































































which is precisely the right side of (6.4). ¥
Proof of Theorem 2. It is straightforward to prove that Υ satisﬁes EF and
IS. By Proposition 1 we know that Υ satisﬁes BCONS.
We now prove that Υ satisﬁes ABCAC. In order to simplify the notation we











. Applying this to (3.1)























































































































































































which means that Υ satisﬁes ABCAC.
We now prove that Υ satisﬁes ABCAP. In order to simplify the notation we













































































































which means that Υ satisﬁes ABCAP.





obtained from (N,V,C) by a change in player i’s utility. Let a and b be the
corresponding constants. We proceed by induction over the number of coalitions
of C.

























j (V ) for each j ∈ N\{i}
because Ψ satisﬁes COV.
Assume the result holds when |C| has at most m − 1 coalitions. We prove it





























































































































































where the last equality comes because Υ satisﬁes (3.1).















































































































































































































































Then, Υ satisﬁes COV. ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . In Theorem 2 we proved that the consistent coalitional
value satisﬁes these ﬁve properties in the class of hyperplane games.
We now prove the reciprocal. Let e Υ be a single value satisfying these ﬁve
properties. We will show that e Υ = Υ. We proceed by induction on the number of
players. If there is only one player then, by EF, e Υ =m a x{x : x ∈ V ({i})} = Υ.





j =1 . T h e r ea r et w op o s s i b l ec o a l i t i o ns t r u c t u r e ,C1 = {i,j} or C2 =
{{i},{j}}.
Given a ∈ R, let (N,va) be the TU game given by va ({i})=va ({j})=a and
va (N)=1 .






































A similar result can be obtained for Υ.
As any hyperplane game with two players (N,V,C) can be obtained from va
(for some a) by linear transformation of utilities of players, and Υ and e Υ satisfy






























i v({i}) − λ
N
j v({j}). (6.5)
Assume that e Υ = Υ for hyperplane games with at most n − 1 players with
n ≥ 3.W ew i l lp r o v ei tw h e n(N,V,C) is a hyperplane game with n players.












j (V ). (6.6)
By induction hypothesis we know that e ΥS (V )=ΥS (V ) for each S Ã N.































































































































































































































































We now prove that e ΥN
i = ΥN
i for each i ∈ Cq ⊂ N. We denote by VS and e VS
the reduced games associated to Υ and e Υ respectively.
If Cq = {i}, by (6.6) we conclude that e ΥN
i = ΥN
i .
Assume that Cq 6= {i}. For each j ∈ Cq \{ i} we consider S = {i,j}.W e
know that VS and e VS are hyperplane games. Then, we denote by vS and ˜ vS the
associated functions to VS and e VS. By the deﬁnition of reduced game and the
induction hypothesis,
e VS ({i})=VS ({i}) and e VS ({j})=VS ({j}).
Hence, vS ({i})=˜ vS ({i}) and vS ({j})=˜ vS ({j}).






k (V ). Then,
e VS (S)=
n
(xi,x j) ∈ R
{i,j} : λ
N
i xi + λ
N























































i ˜ vS ({i}) − λ
N
j ˜ vS ({j}).
































































j ˜ vS ({j}).




i (VS)=( |Cq| − 1) e ΥN














































j ˜ vS ({j}).













































































=( |Cq| − 1)λ
N
i ΥN

















which means that e ΥN
i (V )=ΥN
i (V ). ¥
P r o o fo fR e m a r k4 . ABCAC is independent of the rest of properties because
the consistent value satisﬁes EF, IS, COV, and BCONS but not ABCAC.
Using arguments similar to those used by Winter (1992) we can conclude that
the rest of properties are independent. ¥
Proof of Theorem 4. By Theorem 2 we know that Υ satisﬁes these proper-
ties.
We now prove the reciprocal. We proceed by induction on the number of







is a payoﬀ conﬁguration associated to a value ˜ Υ satisfy-




S ∗ ˜ ΥS = v (S) where v(S)=m a x
©
λ
S ∗ x : x ∈ V (S)
ª
.






S ∗ y ≤ v(S)
ª
.
By induction hypothesis, for each S Ã N, ˜ ΥS = ΥS (V 0). We will show that
˜ ΥN = ΥN (V 0). By simplicity we take ΥN = ΥN (V 0). Assume that i ∈ Cq ∈ C.
Since ˜ Υ satisﬁes EF and ABCAC, using arguments similar to those used in




























































































































































































Proof of Remark 5. EF is independent of the rest of properties. The value
ΓN
i =0for each NTU game (N,V,C) and i ∈ N satisﬁes ABCAC and ABCAP
but not EF.
ABCAP is independent of the rest of properties. The random order coalitional
value satisﬁes EF and ABCAC but not ABCAP.
ABCAC is independent of the rest of properties.








Let π ∈ Πq be an order of players in Cq.W e c o n s i d e r f (π) ∈ RCq such that
for each i ∈ Cq,












where S = Cq ∪ P (π,i) ∪ {i}.


















































j . Then, it is trivial to see that Γ satisﬁes EF
in the class of hyperplane games.
We now prove that Γ satisﬁes ABCAP.
33For each j ∈ Cq we denote by Πq (j) the set of orders of Πq where j is the last
player. If j 6= i,t h e np l a y e ri’s expected marginal contribution conditioned to j












































































































































































































































































i we conclude that Γ satisﬁes ABCAP.
If we proceed with Γ i nt h es a m ew a yt h a tw ed i dw i t hΥ we can extend Γ
to the set of NTU games and prove that Γ also satisﬁes EF and ABCAP in the
class of NTU games. ¥
Proof of Corollary 1: Since each TU game is a hyperplane game we con-
clude that the consistent coalitional value is a single value. Repeating the same
arguments that in the proof of Theorem 4 for TU games we can obtain that there
is at most a value (on the set of TU games) satisfying EF,ABCAC,and ABCAP.
Then, we only need to prove that the Owen value φ satisﬁes these properties.
We know that φ satisﬁes EF. We now prove that φ satisﬁes ABCAC and
ABCAP. By simplicity we assume that S = N.

















































35which means that φ satisﬁes ABCAC in TU games.





























which means that φ satisﬁes ABCAP in TU games. ¥
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